What is sshole?
CVE-2026-123158, nicknamed sshole, is a password authentication bypass in OpenSSH's sshd before 10.6p2. It only occurs on Linux when OpenSSH runs on the musl C library without PAM, as on Alpine Linux. It was published on November 5, 2026, together with the fix in OpenSSH 10.6p2.
With Debian, Ubuntu, AlmaLinux, Rocky Linux, RHEL or CloudLinux and the distribution's OpenSSH, you are most likely not affected, because they use glibc and PAM. Check Alpine VMs and containers that run sshd, and appliances that use musl.
MITRE assigned a CVSS 3.1 score of 8.1 (High). A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the SSH port can log in to accounts with no password and, if that account can raise its privileges (for example through doas), get root. It is being actively exploited: CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on November 9, 2026. Do not run third-party exploits or scripts to check for it.
Are you affected?
A system is vulnerable only if all of these are true:
-
sshdruns without PAM: on Alpine, theopenssh-serverpackage, oropenssh-server-pamwithUsePAM no. -
PasswordAuthenticationisyes, the default. - An account has
*as its password, normal for users who only log in with an SSH key. On Alpine,rootships this way since about 3.16. - Another account has a password, and the first account with a password in
/etc/passwdorder uses a SHA-256 ($5$) or SHA-512 ($6$) hash.
PermitRootLogin prohibit-password, the default, protects root, but not if another account can become root, for example through doas. Alpine's official cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship an alpine user with * and passwordless doas: a single $6$ hash on the machine is enough.
Not affected: containers that do not run sshd, systems with PasswordAuthentication no, locked accounts with !, systems where no account has a $-style hash, and cloud images configured through cloud-init.
Status as of November 12, 2026:
- Alpine Linux 3.16 through 3.24 and edge: affected; fixes below.
- RHEL 8, 9 and 10 and Ubuntu 22.04 and 24.04 LTS: not affected, according to Red Hat and Ubuntu.
- Debian 12 and 13: its tracker marks it vulnerable, with no fix and no note about musl, but it uses glibc and PAM; confirm below.
- AlmaLinux, Rocky Linux, CloudLinux, cPanel/WHM, DirectAdmin and Proxmox VE: no vendor statement, but they use glibc and PAM; confirm below.
Fixed openssh versions per Alpine branch (stable branches carry backports: compare against this list, not against "10.6p2"):
- edge:
10.6_p2-r0 - 3.24:
10.3_p1-r2 - 3.23:
10.2_p1-r1 - 3.22:
10.0_p1-r11 - 3.21:
9.9_p2-r1 - 3.20:
9.7_p1-r6 - 3.19:
9.6_p1-r3 - 3.18:
9.3_p2-r4 - 3.17:
9.1_p1-r7 - 3.16:
9.0_p1-r6
Releases 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 already include the fixed package.
How to check your server
All of these commands are read-only; run them as root.
Debian, Ubuntu and the RHEL family
On Debian and Ubuntu:
dpkg -l openssh-server | tail -1; ldd /usr/sbin/sshd | grep -Ei 'libc\.so|libpam'
On AlmaLinux, Rocky Linux, RHEL and CloudLinux:
rpm -q openssh-server; ldd /usr/sbin/sshd | grep -Ei 'libc\.so|libpam'
Look for libc.so.6 (glibc), not musl. A missing libpam is not an alarm by itself: on OpenSSH 10.x it may only be on sshd-session or sshd-auth.
Alpine and other musl systems
- Check the distribution and the musl loader. If it is missing, that is not conclusive: a statically linked
sshddoes not use it.cat /etc/os-release if ls /lib/ld-musl-*.so.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo 'musl loader present'; else echo 'no musl loader at /lib/ld-musl-*.so.1 (NOT conclusive, run the ldd check)'; fi - Decisive check: see which C library
sshdis linked against (ld-muslis musl;libc.so.6, glibc). On OpenSSH 10.x, repeat it onsshd-sessionandsshd-auth(apk info -L openssh-servershows their paths). Empty output does not mean you are safe. Only runlddon your distribution's own binaries:ldd /usr/sbin/sshd | grep -Ei 'musl|libc\.so|libpam' - Check the effective configuration for a key-only account. Without
-C,sshd -TignoresMatchblocks and can shownoinstead ofyes. Vulnerable meanspasswordauthentication yeswithusepam no(on Alpine'sopenssh-server, built without PAM,usepamdoes not appear). It reflects the files, not ansshdthat has not been restarted:sshd -T -C user=YOUR_USER,host=localhost,addr=127.0.0.1 | grep -Ei '^(passwordauthentication|usepam|permitrootlogin|authenticationmethods) ' - List the accounts involved (names only): before
---, the accounts with*; after it, those with a$5$or$6$hash. An empty second list only holds for now; directory-service users do not show up. Never share the contents of/etc/shadow:awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow; echo ---; awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/{print $1}' /etc/shadow - Compare the installed
openssh-server(oropenssh-server-pam) version with the list for your branch.
Docker containers
This command shows whether a container has sshd, uses musl and is running it. Empty output means "not running right now", not that the image has no sshd:
docker exec YOUR_CONTAINER sh -c 'command -v sshd; ls /lib/ld-musl-*.so.1 2>/dev/null; ps | grep "[s]shd"'
How to mitigate
| Option | Best for | Restart? | Durable? |
|---|---|---|---|
| A: update openssh | Affected systems and containers | Yes, sshd (or recreate the container) | Yes |
| B: disable passwords | If you cannot update yet | Yes, sshd | Temporary |
Option A: update openssh and restart sshd (recommended)
Alpine's official command upgrades every package, not only openssh; try it on a non-critical host first:
apk upgrade -U -a
Upgrading does not restart the running sshd; restart it yourself. Keep your current session open and confirm you can open a new one before closing it:
rc-service sshd restart
On other musl systems, install the manufacturer's update with the OpenSSH 10.6p2 fix and restart sshd; if there is none yet, apply option B.
For containers, rebuild Alpine images that install openssh-server with the fixed package and recreate them; for third-party images, compare their openssh version with the list.
Option B: disable password authentication (temporary workaround)
First, make sure SSH key login works and do not close your session until you have tested a new one. This Alpine block sets PasswordAuthentication no in a drop-in file and in sshd_config, including Match blocks, saves a copy as sshd_config.bak and restarts sshd. It should show passwordauthentication no:
mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
echo 'PasswordAuthentication no' > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf
sed -i.bak -e '1i PasswordAuthentication no' \
-e 's/^\(\s*PasswordAuthentication[^y#]*\)yes/\1no/i' \
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart
sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication
- Effect: nobody can log in over SSH with a password.
- Run it only once: if you run it again,
sshd_config.bakis overwritten and you lose the original. - To undo it, delete
00-no-passwords.conf, restoresshd_config.bakand restartsshd.
On other musl systems, set PasswordAuthentication no and restart sshd.
Detecting signs of compromise
Look for Accepted password for lines for accounts with no password (alpine, root or key-only users):
grep -E 'sshd.*Accepted password for' /var/log/messages
- Legitimate users also produce these lines: compare them with the
*accounts from step 4. Check rotated logs too. - An attacker with root can edit logs: finding nothing does not prove there was no access.
- On exposed machines, review
doasuse, recent users and files, andauthorized_keys.
After mitigating
- Confirm
openssh-serveris at your branch's version or higher and that you restartedsshd. - Run
sshd -T -Cagain for your key-only accounts. - If you applied option B, you can undo it after updating, or keep it if you do not need passwords.
- If the machine was exposed and you cannot rule out access, treat it as compromised and rotate the SSH keys and credentials stored on it.
Need help?
Open a ticket at soporte.telecu.cloud and reference: CVE-2026-123158.